Inheritance Claim Time Limit in Pakistan: 2026 Supreme Court Ruling

Can a Pakistani heir lose an inheritance claim just because many years have passed? On 13 November 2026, a five-member Larger Bench of the Supreme Court of Pakistan answered: the share itself never expires, but the remedy is limited. The six-year clock under Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908 starts only when the heir comes to know of an overt act denying his or her title.

The Judgment in Short

• The share never lapses. An heir's title vests on the death of the deceased and is not extinguished by time. Section 28 of the Limitation Act, 1908 no longer exists, so limitation bars only the remedy.
• Limitation does apply. A civil court cannot declare Article 120 inapplicable to inheritance suits. A suit for a share is governed by Article 120: six years.
• The clock starts late, not early. Between co-heirs, time runs only from an actual denial of the heir's title that has been brought home to the heir. A wrong mutation, a repeated jamabandi entry, long possession or non-payment of produce does not start it.
• Successors are not shut out. The heirs of a deceased heir sue on their own vested title, but they take the claim as it stood.
• Buyers are protected only if honest and careful. A good-faith purchaser for value in open possession gets the benefit of a diligence-based rule, but must prove good faith and reasonable inquiry.

Case at a Glance

• Lead case: Mst. Meraj Bibi & another v. Mst. Zar Gula (decd.) through LRs & others, C.A. No. 909/2013
• Connected matters: 18 appeals and petitions in total, from the Peshawar, Lahore and Balochistan High Courts
• Court: Supreme Court of Pakistan, Larger Bench (five judges)
• Bench: Justice Shahid Waheed, Justice Naeem Akhter Afghan, Justice Aqeel Ahmed Abbasi, Justice Shakeel Ahmad, Justice Miangul Hassan Aurangzeb
• Judgment written by: Justice Shahid Waheed
• Dates: Heard and dated 7 October 2026; announced 13 November 2026 at Lahore
• Questions decided: Nine questions of law on limitation, waiver, estoppel, successors, purchasers and custom
• Merits of the individual appeals: Not decided. The Court sent each case back to the regular Benches.

Why Did the Supreme Court Need a Larger Bench?

For years, two lines of Supreme Court authority ran side by side. Claims succeeded and failed in every decade, sometimes before Benches with common members. The judgment notes that "like cases were not decided alike".

The first line said that inheritance is a divine right, that no limitation runs against a co-sharer, that a wrong mutation creates no title, and that there is no estoppel against the Shariah. Cases such as Haji v. Khuda Yar (PLD 1987 SC 453), Ghulam Ali v. Mst. Ghulam Sarwar Naqvi (PLD 1990 SC 1), Muhammad Iqbal v. Allah Bachaya (2005 SCMR 1447), Faqir Ali v. Sakina Bibi (PLD 2022 SC 85) and Abrar Hussain v. Mst. Bibi Shahida (PLD 2026 SC 42) lean this way.

The second line said that Article 120 applies, that a declaration is discretionary, and that delay and laches count. It also said that estoppel and acquiescence can defeat an heir who watched third parties buy and build, and that an heir who did not sue in his lifetime leaves his own heirs with nothing to sue on. Cases such as Atta Muhammad v. Maula Bakhsh (2007 SCMR 1446), Mst. Grana v. Sahib Kamala Bibi (PLD 2014 SC 167), Abdul Haq v. Mst. Surraya Begum (2002 SCMR 1330) and Muhammad Rustam v. Mst. Makhan Jan (2013 SCMR 299) are cited on this side.

Between the two lines sits Saadat Khan v. Shahid-ur-Rehman (PLD 2023 SC 362). The Court treats it as a bridge: it applied Article 120 but ran time only from an overt act the heirs actually knew of.

The Bench identified four conflicts of principle that remained once the facts of each case were accounted for:

1. Can waiver, estoppel and acquiescence operate among co-heirs at all?
2. Does a predecessor's failure to sue deprive his successor of standing?
3. Is limitation "not attracted" in inheritance cases generally?
4. For a deceased who died under custom, do the Shariat Application Laws revive a claim, and from when?

The Court added the fourth question itself after hearing counsel and the amici curiae. A great deal of agricultural land still descends along lines first drawn by custom.

The Core Rule: When Does Limitation Start for an Inheritance Claim?

The Court calls its test the rule of the known overt act. Time runs only from the date the heir came to know of an overt act repudiating his or her title. Nothing else starts the clock.

Step one: the right and the remedy are different. Before 31 August 1991, section 28 of the Limitation Act, 1908 extinguished the right to property when the period for a suit for possession ran out. It was declared repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam in Maqbool Ahmad v. Hakoomat-e-Pakistan (1991 SCMR 2063) and ceased to have effect. Since then, no provision extinguishes title by lapse of time. In the Court's words, "time can lock the courtroom door; it cannot change the name on the title."

Step two: limitation is still attracted. The Court refused the argument that inheritance, being a divine right, is outside limitation altogether. Under Articles 203D and 203G of the Constitution, only the Federal Shariat Court can declare a law repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam. Article 120 was never touched by that process, so a civil court cannot disapply it for a whole class of suits. Statements that limitation is "not attracted" in inheritance cases (such as in Hidayat Khan v. Mst. Nasreen, PLD 2025 SC 502) are read down accordingly.

Step three: Article 120 governs, and the accrual is interpreted. Article 120 gives six years "when the right to sue accrues" but does not name the event. That is a question of interpretation, and section 4 of the Enforcement of Shariah Act, 1991 directs courts to prefer the reading consistent with Islamic principles. The Court held that between co-heirs a denial has two parts: an overt act inconsistent with the other's title, and the bringing home of that act to him or her. Until both occur, the heir remains in constructive possession through the co-heir who occupies the land.

The Bright Line (Para 195)

A suit concerning a share in inheritance is out of time only if the defendant proves an actual denial of the claimant's right, brought home to the claimant or his predecessor (or, as against a transferee in good faith for valuable consideration in open possession, which the claimant or his predecessor ought by ordinary diligence to have known), more than six years before the suit, or, where the heir seeks to avoid an instrument to which he was himself a party, proves that the facts entitling him to avoid it became known to him more than three years before the suit; in every other case, it is within time.

The Court states the idea plainly in its opening summary: the clock is "wound by denial and set going by knowledge; neither alone will do."

What Counts as an "Actual Denial" of an Heir's Share?

The Court draws a line between an actual denial (a compulsory cause of action) and a threatened denial (an optional one). Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 lets a person sue against anyone "denying, or interested to deny" his title. The word "may" means he is not obliged to sue on a mere threat. As the judgment puts it, "a threat to one's title is an invitation to sue; a repudiation of it is a summons."

The five overt acts the Court identifies (the list is illustrative, not closed) are:

1. Alienation of the heir's share, or of joint property exceeding the seller's share, to a third person with delivery of possession. This includes one heir receiving the whole price or compensation for joint land taken by the State, as in Saadat Khan.
2. Execution or attestation of an instrument or transfer mutation setting up exclusive title in another, such as a gift, sale, relinquishment or settlement attributed to the heir or to the deceased.
3. A demand by the heir for his share, and its refusal.
4. Physical exclusion of the heir from possession, coupled with an assertion of exclusive ownership.
5. A written repudiation of the heir's title, asserting exclusive ownership, delivered to the heir personally.

The fifth is the route by which an heir in possession who claims everything can start the clock himself: say so openly and in writing.

What does NOT start the clock:

• A wrong or incomplete inheritance mutation
• Repetition of that entry in the periodical record (jamabandi)
• Failure to pay produce or rent
• Oral denial with no overt act
• Possession by the co-heir, however long

The Court's own phrase for this list is memorable: "Whispers in the patwarkhana do not amount to a declaration of war."

How Is Knowledge Proved, and Who Carries the Burden?

Knowledge can be direct or inferred. The Court lists circumstances that may support an inference that the heir knew of a denial:

• residence in the same locality
• participation in proceedings about the property
• open development of the property near the claimant over a period of years
• receipt of consideration or part of the compensation
• a demand made by the claimant

Two things cannot do the job alone. The first is a revenue entry, because the record is kept by the State for fiscal purposes and heirs, particularly women, have no reason to inspect it. The second is length of possession, which "cannot by itself supply either the overt act or the knowledge".

The burden is shared, but it rests heavily on the person holding the share. The Court distributes it as follows (para 134):

1. The plaintiff proves heirship and that the property formed part of the deceased's estate.
2. A defendant who relies on a gift, sale, relinquishment, settlement or custom must prove it strictly and in accordance with law, before limitation is even reached.
3. A defendant who pleads limitation must prove an actual denial and its date.
4. The plaintiff must plead the date and manner of his knowledge, with particulars in the plaint, as Order VII, Rule 6 CPC requires. The defendant may then prove earlier knowledge, directly or by circumstances.

The Court relies on Article 122 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 (a fact especially within one person's knowledge must be proved by him). In its words: "He who holds another's share must explain how; he who says the claim is late must show when the clock started."

Limitation is a mixed question. The trial court must frame separate issues. It may not decide limitation on the pleadings alone, unless the plaint itself discloses an actual denial known to the plaintiff more than six years before the suit (para 196).

Does Limitation Run Against Fraud, Forged Mutations and Fake Gifts?

The Court reconciles two strands of its own case law. One says limitation does not run against fraud (Arshad Khan, Shabla, Muhammad Yaqoob, Faqir Ali, Muhammad Boota). The other says a transaction procured by fraud is voidable and must be set aside in time (Raja Muhammad Fazil Khan, Javed Shafi). The key is the test from Muhammad Akbar Shah v. Muhammad Yusuf Shah (PLD 1964 SC 329): did the transaction produce legal effects against the plaintiff?

An heir who was not a party to the transaction. A mutation, deed or decree that the excluded heir did not take part in does not bind him. It is void as against him, not voidable, so he need not sue to cancel it and Article 91 does not apply. A forged instrument attributed to him is on the same footing: "A forgery is not a defective transaction; it is no transaction at all." His suit is for a declaration, joint possession or partition under Article 120, running from an actual denial brought home to him.

An heir who was a party. If the heir himself signed a gift or relinquishment, or appeared before the revenue officer, and later alleges undue influence, coercion or misrepresentation, the transaction is voidable. He must sue to set it aside under Article 91 within three years of the facts becoming known. Even then, the beneficiary must prove that the transaction was free and understood (Mst. Hamida Begum v. Mst. Murad Begum, PLD 1975 SC 624). A bare relinquishment of accrued inheritance is void in any case.

Section 18 and concealment. Where fraud keeps the heir from knowledge of the right to sue, section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1908 computes time from when the fraud first became known. The Court adds three points:

• The fraud that engages section 18 is fraud that conceals the right to sue, not the fraud that is itself the cause of action. It must be pleaded with particulars and dates under Order VI, Rule 4 CPC and proved.
• In a relationship of trust, silence can be concealment. A brother who knows his sister does not know of the gift mutation he procured, and lets her go on believing the land is joint, conceals it "as surely as if he had hidden the register".
• Section 18 cannot be invoked against a transferee who took in good faith and for valuable consideration.

The Court's summary: "Fraud excuses ignorance; it does not excuse indifference. Once the heir knows that he has been cheated, the law gives him six years to say so, and that is time enough."

Can Silence, Waiver or Estoppel Take Away an Heir's Share?

The Court says courts have often piled up four weak pleas (relinquishment, waiver, estoppel and acquiescence) as if together they made a strong one. They do not. Each has its own elements and each must be proved.

• Relinquishment. A vested share in land is specific property owned, not a debt or claim. It can leave the heir only by a recognised transfer: sale, gift with delivery of possession, exchange, takharuj or a bona fide family settlement. A bare relinquishment of accrued inheritance is void. The principle does not depend on the heir's sex, though the presumption of undue influence weighs more heavily where the heir is a woman.
• Waiver. It requires intentional relinquishment of a known right. Silence supplies neither knowledge nor intention. Even a proved waiver operates on claims, not on ownership of property.
• Estoppel (Article 114, Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984). It does not operate in favour of a co-heir who caused the exclusion, since he was never misled. It can operate in favour of a third-party transferee, on proof of four elements.
• Acquiescence. This is assent inferred from conduct with knowledge. Without knowledge, there is nothing to acquiesce in.

The four elements of estoppel in favour of a buyer. The transferee must prove:

1. the heir's knowledge of his own right
2. the heir's knowledge of the transfer, or of the transferor's assertion of exclusive title
3. a representation by words or conduct, with silence counting only where the heir was under a duty to speak and the buyer could not have discovered the truth by reasonable inquiry
4. the buyer's action in reliance, to his detriment

Proving a settlement or takharuj. The party relying on it must show by clear and cogent evidence the heir's knowledge of her precise share. He must also show a free choice or independent advice (especially where a woman gives up her share to male relatives) and compliance with the requirements of the mode of transfer. A recital of consent in a mutation is not enough. A settlement or takharuj that is not evidenced by a contemporaneous written instrument, executed after the heir was informed of her share, "will rarely discharge the heavy burden" on the beneficiary.

The resulting rule (para 152). No heir shall be held to have waived, abandoned, acquiesced in or been estopped from claiming his share unless the court records, on evidence, a finding that he knew of his right and of the act said to defeat it.

On the precedents: Abrar Hussain is affirmed as between co-heirs. Grana is affirmed as to transferees, but only on proof of the four elements. Ghulam Abbas v. Muhammad Shafi (2016 SCMR 1403) is held not to state the law correctly, to the extent it applied estoppel and abandonment against heirs without such proof.

Can the Legal Heirs of a Deceased Heir Still Claim the Share?

Yes. The Court disagreed with the line of cases (Abdul Haq, Muhammad Rustam, Ghulam Abbas, Faheeman Begum) that held an heir's own heirs lack locus standi if he never sued. The share vested in the excluded heir at the death of the original owner and passed, on his death, to his own heirs, who sue on their own vested title. A contrary rule would reduce a vested share to a life interest ending on non-assertion. That would revive the customary "limited owner" that the Shariat Application Laws abolished. Section 5 of the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1962 itself provides that where an heir entitled on termination of a limited estate has died in the meantime, his share devolves on his own heirs.

But the successor takes the claim as it stood, because of sections 2(8) and 9 of the Limitation Act, 1908. There are three possible positions:

• An actual denial was brought home to the predecessor and six years expired: the successor's suit is barred.
• An actual denial was brought home, and time had begun but not expired: only the unexpired balance remains.
• The predecessor never knew of any actual denial, or none occurred: time runs from the successor's own knowledge.

The successor must plead which position applies, with particulars. He need not prove ignorance by direct evidence. Distance, seclusion, illiteracy, dependence on the heir in possession and the absence of any transaction to which the predecessor was a party can support the inference. But where the defendant proves an overt act done in the predecessor's knowledge, a bare assertion of ignorance will not do.

A note on Saadat Khan. The Court warns that the 2023 decision was widely reported as meaning a woman's inheritance can be claimed only in her lifetime and that her children cannot claim after her death. That is not what it decided. The sisters lost because, while alive, they knew their brother had taken the whole compensation as owner, and let six years pass. In the Court's words: "A judgment is authority for what it decides on its facts, not for the headline written about it."

What Protection Does a Buyer or Housing Society Get?

The Court calls these the hardest cases: a stranger who paid full price, built a house and raised a family, now facing an heir he never met. Both are innocent of the original wrong, yet one must bear the cost. The Court allocates the loss by asking who was best placed to prevent the wrong, who acted with knowledge or closed eyes, and who led the other to rely.

The starting point. No one can pass a better title than he has. A co-heir may sell his own undivided share (section 44, Transfer of Property Act, 1882), and the buyer is accommodated within that share on partition. For any excess, the sale does not bind the excluded heir unless section 41 or estoppel is proved. The buyer's remedy for the excess lies against his seller.

Three protections, each proved by the buyer:

1. Section 41, Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The seller must have been the ostensible owner with the express or implied consent of the persons interested. The transfer must be for consideration, and the buyer must have acted in good faith after reasonable care. Consent cannot be found in a mutation the heir did not attend, in an entry made by revenue staff, or in silence alone. Section 2 of the Act saves Muslim law but does not exclude section 41, which is consistent with the Muslim law rule that a sale by a non-owner binds the owner only on ratification.
2. Estoppel, on the four elements set out above.
3. Limitation, where the heir's suit is out of time counted from his knowledge of the sale, actual or what ordinary diligence would have given him.

What reasonable care means. In a country where inheritance mutations are attested without the heirs, a prudent buyer must at minimum inspect the inheritance mutation or succession record and inquire into the pedigree. He must also ask every heir shown there, and people in the locality who know the family. A buyer who purchases the whole from one heir when the record shows others is fixed with notice. The law "does not ask the purchaser to be a detective; it asks him not to be wilfully blind."

Constructive knowledge, but only against a good-faith buyer. Between co-heirs, time runs from actual knowledge. Against a transferee in good faith for value who has entered open possession, the heir is charged with what ordinary diligence would have revealed. Section 18 is not available against such a buyer. Even here, a revenue entry alone is not notice, and knowledge will be more readily inferred where the buyer has built or cultivated and the heir lives in the locality. A buyer who knew of the heir, was party to the fraud or skipped the inquiries a prudent buyer makes is not a good-faith buyer.

Long possession. Possession, however long, does not itself confer title, because Article 144 and section 28 no longer operate. It is evidence of the date of denial, of knowledge, of good faith and of the heir's conduct. "Time is a witness, not a judge."

What the heir gets if the buyer is protected. The heir's remedy is the market value of her share at the date of the decree, plus mesne profits, against the selling co-heir, provided that claim is itself within time. Against the seller, time runs only from the heir's actual knowledge of the sale. The heir may join seller and buyer in one suit, and the court decides limitation separately against each. The Court sums it up: "the land follows the title, the loss follows the wrong."

What If the Deceased Died Under Custom, Before the Shariat Acts?

Much of Pakistan's agricultural land first passed along customary lines, with widows and daughters taking at most a limited estate. The Court asked whether such devolutions are "past and closed".

General rule. Where the deceased died before the Shariah became the rule of decision for that property in his territory, and no provision reaches back, a devolution under proved custom is a completed event as to his death.

Four exceptions that swallow much of the rule. The rule does not apply:

• (a) in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, because of the retrospective deeming in section 3(2) of the NWFP Act, 1935
• (b) to limited estates held by females under custom that subsisted when the relevant Act came into force
• (c) where custom is not pleaded and strictly proved
• (d) to customary mutations made after the Shariah had become the rule of decision, which are nullities against the excluded heirs

In every case, time runs only from an actual denial brought home to the heir after the Shariah became applicable. A statute that creates a right does not, by the same stroke, deny it.

Territory by territory:

• Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (settled districts). Section 3(2) of the 1935 Act deems every Muslim deceased to have died under the Shariah, whenever he died (Muzaffar Khan, PLD 1984 SC 394; Habibullah Jan, PLD 1991 SC 93). For deaths before 6 December 1935, no cause of action accrues before 1950. The view that claims had to be brought between 1950 and 1962 is disapproved.
• Former PATA. The deceased is deemed to have died under the Shariah (Mst. Farida v. Rehmatullah, PLD 1991 SC 213). There is no enforceable claim before 15 January 1976, when the 1962 Act was extended.
• Former FATA. Custom remained the rule until the 2018 merger. Whether the 1935 or 1962 Acts reach back to earlier deaths was not argued and is left open. For deaths after the extension, the Shariah governs.
• Punjab and Islamabad Capital Territory. Before 15 March 1948, custom governs if proved, and section 2-A confirms male heirs as absolute owners of agricultural land acquired under custom. Limited estates are treated separately. From 15 March 1948, the Shariah applies directly.
• Bahawalpur. The Punjab Act of 1948 applied, so the date is 15 March 1948 (Muhammad Boota, 2023 SCMR 1901).
• Sindh. For non-agricultural property, the Shariah applies from 7 October 1937. For agricultural land, it applies from the Sind Amendment Act of 1950 (Khairpur: its own Act). Custom must be proved with particular rigour.
• Balochistan. In settled districts, the Shariah applies to non-agricultural property from 7 October 1937 and to all property from 31 December 1962. In tribal areas, it applies from the 1976 extension of the 1962 Act.

Limited estates. Where a widow or daughter held a limited estate under custom, the heirs of the last full owner become owners in constructive possession when it ends, with title relating back to his death (Faiz Ullah v. Dilawar Hussain, 2022 SCMR 1647). A mutation continuing to show the former limited owner as owner of the whole is only a threatened denial. In the Punjab, whether the estate was saved by the proviso to section 3 of the 1962 Act, or terminated on 31 December 1962, decides when succession opened.

The Court's Step-by-Step Test, Directions and Recommendations

The Ten-Step Test for Trial Courts (Para 197)

1. Heirship and estate. Has the plaintiff proved he or his predecessor is an heir and the property was part of the estate? If not, the suit fails on merits.
2. Governing law. Did the deceased die under the Shariah, or under proved custom at a date when custom governed? If a limited estate is involved, when did it end?
3. Divesting transaction. If the defendant relies on a gift, sale, relinquishment, settlement or takharuj, has he proved it strictly? A bare relinquishment is void and is disregarded.
4. Special law. Does a special statute fix a period? If so, it governs (section 29(2)).
5. Nature of relief. Partition while in joint possession: no limitation. Resisting another's claim of exclusive title: no limitation. Avoiding an instrument the heir signed: Article 91, three years. Otherwise: Article 120.
6. Actual denial. Has the defendant proved one of the five overt acts? If not, the suit is in time, whatever the age of the mutation.
7. Knowledge. When was the denial brought home to the claimant or his predecessor? Fraud postpones time under section 18, except against a good-faith purchaser for value.
8. Successors. Did the predecessor know? Apply the three positions set out earlier.
9. Computation. Count six years (or three under Article 91) from that date, applying sections 4 to 25. These include disability (sections 6 to 8) and written acknowledgement (section 19).
10. Third parties. Separately from limitation, has any buyer proved section 41 or estoppel? If not, the sale binds only the seller's own share.

Trial courts must frame separate issues on governing law, the divesting transaction, actual denial and its date, knowledge and its date, and the buyer's good faith. They should decide such suits expeditiously.

Binding Directions to Authorities (Para 202, Under Article 187)

• Inheritance mutations. No mutation without a NADRA family registration record or equivalent proof of all heirs. Every heir must receive written notice, including women at their own address. Any heir said to have received less than his or her share must give a recorded statement.
• Gift, sale, relinquishment or settlement mutations by an heir. The revenue officer must record the heir's personal appearance, identity and a statement that she was informed of her precise share. For a female heir, a woman revenue officer should be present where available. Non-compliance may be weighed by the court in deciding whether the heir had knowledge.
• Registering bodies. Development authorities, cantonment boards and cooperative housing societies must not transfer property on inheritance except on a succession certificate, letters of administration or a decree. They must give written notice to all heirs first.
• Settlement officers. In areas under first settlement, including the merged tribal districts, they must record all heirs according to the Shariah and give notice of objection proceedings.

Recommendations to the Legislature (Para 203)

• A registered instrument for any relinquishment, settlement or takharuj of an inherited share, executed after the heir is informed of the share.
• A specific article in the Limitation Act for suits by heirs, with an outer long-stop running from an open transfer for value with possession.
• Amending section 498A of the Pakistan Penal Code, or enacting a companion provision, so that depriving any heir, man or woman, by deceitful or illegal means is an offence. The special protection for women would be preserved.
• A statutory duty, with a reasonable period, to complete distribution of an estate after devolution is recorded.

Effect in Time (Para 204)

The principles govern suits and proceedings pending on, or instituted after, the date of the judgment, and appeals, revisions and petitions arising from them. The judgment does not reopen decrees or orders that have attained finality, or transactions closed by them.

What Should Heirs, Co-Heirs in Possession and Buyers Do Now?

The following is general guidance drawn from the judgment, not advice on any particular case.

If you think you were excluded from an inheritance

• Work out whether, and when, you learned of an overt act repudiating your share: a sale, a gift or transfer mutation, a refusal of your demand, physical exclusion, or a written denial. If so, note the date. The six years run from there.
• If you only discovered a wrong mutation or a jamabandi entry, that alone does not start the clock. You may sue, but you are not forced to.
• In your plaint, state the date and manner of your knowledge, with particulars. Plead any fraud or concealment with dates.
• If you are claiming through a parent or other heir who has died, plead what your predecessor knew and why he or she did not sue.
• Do not treat a signed paper as the end of the matter. A bare relinquishment is void, and a gift, settlement or takharuj must be proved by the person relying on it.

If you hold inherited land that includes others' shares

• Silence will not protect you. If you intend to claim the whole, the judgment says to say so openly and in writing, delivered to your co-heir personally. Concealment will not start the clock.
• Expect to prove any gift, sale or settlement strictly, and to prove the date of any denial you rely on.
• Selling beyond your own share leaves the excess unprotected against the excluded heir, unless the buyer proves section 41 or estoppel. The loss is meant to fall on you as the seller.

If you are buying or financing inherited property

• Inspect the inheritance mutation or succession record, check the pedigree, and ask every heir shown there and neighbours who know the family.
• Do not buy the whole from one heir when the record shows others.
• Keep your records of inquiry and payment. You will have to prove good faith, consideration and reasonable care.
• Housing societies and development authorities should now notify all heirs before an inheritance transfer.

What the Judgment Leaves Open

• Former FATA. Whether section 3(2) of the 1935 Act, or the 1962 Act as read in Farida, reaches back to deaths in the former Federally Administered Tribal Areas before the 2018 merger was not argued. The Court left it for a case where it arises.
• Article 141 or Article 120 for saved limited estates. Where a saved limited estate ended by the holder's death, the Court leaves open which article governs a suit against a person holding under her.
• Ordinary diligence. The standard of what an heir "ought to have known" against a good-faith buyer in open possession will be argued case by case. The Court says no single factor and no number of years is decisive.
• The individual appeals. The Court expressly gave no view on the merits of the 18 matters before it. They go back to regular Benches.

Sources

Primary source: Supreme Court of Pakistan, Mst. Meraj Bibi & another v. Mst. Zar Gula (decd.) through LRs & others, C.A. No. 909/2013 and connected matters (Larger Bench, judgment by Shahid Waheed J.).

Main statutes discussed: Limitation Act, 1908 (sections 2(8), 3, 6, 9, 10, 18, 19, 23, 28, 29; Articles 91, 120, 123, 127, 141, 142, 144); Specific Relief Act, 1877 (sections 39, 42); Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (sections 2, 41, 44, 51); Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 (Articles 114, 122); West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1962; North-West Frontier Province Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1935; Enforcement of Shariah Act, 1991; Pakistan Penal Code, section 498A; Constitution, Articles 24, 25, 187, 203D, 203G, 227.

For related matters, you may also want to read our guides on inheritance law in Pakistan, family law, and property disputes.